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Abstract
In recent years scholars have discussed the relationship of contractual and relational
governance in information systems outsourcing. For a long time the substitutional view of
governance mechanisms originating from transaction cost theory was dominant. As an
example, complex contracts were seen as an opposing alternative to unwritten agreements
based on trust. Empirical results, however, challenged this view and rather supported the
competing perspective, implicating that relational and contractual governance are
complements. However, results of novel investigations favor another argument: Relational
and contractual governance mechanisms can simultaneously be complements and substitutes.
However, if governance mechanisms can be both substitutes and complements, the question
arises whether the relationship between governance mechanisms is the outcome of distinct
processes of interaction between contractual and relational governance. Therefore our
research question is: Which underlying processes explain the relationship (substitutes or
complements) between relational and contractual governance? To answer this research
question we conducted an exploratory, multiple-case study of five IT outsourcing projects at
a leading global bank. Our results show, that there are three archetypical processes that
illustrate how the interaction between relational and contractual governance results in their
complementarity. Our major contribution is a shift in perspective. While former studies
focused on explaining, whether contractual and relational governance are complements or
substitutes, we answer the question how and why they become complements or substitutes.
We argue that the processes we discovered have the explanatory power to unify contradictory
empirical results by tracing them back to differences in the underlying processes. Based on
our findings, we give implications for further research.
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In recent years scholars have discussed the relationship of contractual and relational 
governance in information systems outsourcing. For a long time the substitutional view of 
governance mechanisms originating from transaction cost theory was dominant. As an example, 
complex contracts were seen as an opposing alternative to unwritten agreements based on trust. 
Empirical results, however, challenged this view and rather supported the competing perspective, 
implicating that relational and contractual governance are complements. However, results of 
novel investigations (Tiwana, forthcoming, Woolthuis et al., 2005) favor another argument: 
Relational and contractual governance mechanisms can simultaneously be complements and 
substitutes. 
However, if governance mechanisms can be both substitutes and complements, the 
question arises whether the relationship between governance mechanisms is the outcome of 
distinct processes of interaction between contractual and relational governance. Therefore our 
research question is: Which underlying processes explain the relationship (substitutes or 
complements) between relational and contractual governance? To answer this research question 
we conducted an exploratory, multiple-case study of five IT outsourcing projects at a leading 
global bank. 
Our results show, that there are three archetypical processes that illustrate how the 
interaction between relational and contractual governance results in their complementarity. In 
addition, we find one process explaining a substitutional relationship between contractual and 
relational governance. 
The first archetype ‘contractual governance as enabler for relational governance’ explains 
how contractual clauses stipulate social interaction fertilizing relational governance. The second 
archetype ‘relational governance as enabler for contractual completeness’ explains how strong 
social ties give access to knowledge which would otherwise be hard to access and is utilized to 
refine contractual clauses. The third archetype ‘contractual governance as safety net’ shows how 
contractual governance facilitates application of relational governance by reducing perceived 
relational risk. While the aforementioned processes explain complementarity, ‘relational 
governance as enabler for contractual flexibility’ shows how strong social ties reduce the need 
for detailed contractual clauses and hence explain substitution. 
Our major contribution is a shift in perspective. While former studies focused on 
explaining, whether contractual and relational governance are complements or substitutes, we 
answer the question how and why they become complements or substitutes. We argue that the 
processes we discovered have the explanatory power to unify contradictory empirical results by 
tracing them back to differences in the underlying processes. Based on our findings, we give 
implications for further research. 
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